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1. Introduction 
The people of the Northem Areas of Pakistan are by no means a "people 
without history". History, or aspects ofit, forma very important part oftheir 
sense of identity. There is a considerable indigenous historiographical pro-
duction that includes, besides many minor articles and publications, two 
large works about the history of a local dynasty (Shah Rais Khan 1987) and 
an important sub-region ofthe area (Qudratullah Beg 1980), both written by 
members of the traditional elite. 2 These works are dedicated to the promo-
tion of an image of the uniqueness and importance of the region and its 
people. Oral histories aim at a similar direction: they give, for example, 
accounts of the origin, migration, and settlement of clans, name their ances-
tors, and thus lay a basis for a. clan's identity and separateness. It is espe-
cially popular to relate one's own family to those of famous historical heroes 
or to dynasties, be they of Alexander the Great, of Changez Khan (Genghis 
Khan) and his successors, or to the old Iranian Kayhani dynasty. 
Such histories, whether written or oral, are not always totally satisfactory 
to a reader or listener who expects "true" or at least consistent accounts 
about the past. They are as much stories as histories in that they sometimes 
blur the limits between myth and a factual kind of history and in that they 
are now and then prone to the twisting of historical facts. More often than 
not, different and, at times, contradictory stories about the "same" chain of 
events are told. 
These remarks about the "story-telling" character of local histories do not 
at all intend to discredit their value. White has argued convincingly that 
even scholarly historiography never refrains completely from telling stories. 
lt both treats established facts selectively and goes beyond them in conjec-
1 Although this paper is almost completely based on written sources, the impor-
tance of its topic was realized during field research in Gilgit conducted for 15 
months in two terms between 1991and1993. 
2 Raja Shah Rais Khan was the patemal uncle of the raja ("king") of Gilgit; 
· Qudratullah Beg beJonged to the very influential family of wazirs ("m.inistcrs") in 
Hunza. 
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turing aböut what is not actually known (White 1986: 64). White takes the 
historiography of the French Revolution to show that different histories 
written by different authors about the same event are never the same story 
(ibid.: 78f.). History is, as Ardener remarks with some understatement, not 
entirely an objective matter (Ardener 1989: 22). This does not mean that to 
accept the relativity ofhistories implies the renunciation ofthe possibility of 
establishing historical facts. 3 lt simply means that history is never content 
with relating chronicles. History always comprises interpretation and tries to 
structure the sequence of events from a particular point of view. lt estab-
lishes a meaning of the past. 
Still, local histories in the Northern Areas (as in other parts of the world) 
do not always stick to the facts. lt seems that for the (hi)story-teller it is 
often less important that he is telling a "true" and consistent story than that 
he is telling at all and is thus able to relate himself to a past. History is not 
told in its own right but in relation to a present. The past becomes a resource 
ofpresent identity. There is little abstract interest in history. lt is interesting 
mainly as one's own history. 
This article deals with an especially important period of the Northern 
Areas' history, with stories that assumed the function of something like a 
myth of origin of the Northern Areas and that present the modern heroes of 
the region. Everybody who had played a part in it is eager to tell his story. l 
will discuss perspectives on the freedom struggle or, as it is called, the jang 
äzäd'i, which began in autumn 1947 in Gilgit, overthrew the Kashmiri 
administration, and led to the accession of the region to the newly formed 
state of Pakistan. The jang äzäd'i is unanimously regarded as one of the 
most important periods of the Northern Areas' history.4 Due to the fact that 
my material relates mostly to Gilgit, the capital of the Northern Areas, my 
discussion is limited to perspectives from Gilgit and to the events in Gilgit 
in 1947.5 After briefly examining reports of the events by protagonists, I 
3 As some anthropologists seem to fear (cf„ e.g„ Sehlee 1993). 
4 For example, in a voluminous collection of articles dedicated to the geography, 
history, and culture of the Northem Areas, all ten papers in the section "modern 
history" are related to the freedom struggle of 1947/48 (Manzum Ali 1985a). 
5 lt thus excludes mainly the events in Skardu, the capital of the sub-region Bal-
tistan of the Northem Areas and the other important centre of the freedom strug-
gle. For an account of the jang äzädf in Baltistan, cf. Mohammacl Yusuf 1987; 
for an Indian perspective on the same events, cf. Skumar Mahajan · 1973. 
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will show that the meaning of these events has changed. In the local 
political discourse of today, they are no longer seen only as the expression 
of the desire to join Pakistan. They are also taken as symbols of the ability 
of the people to revolt against foreign rulers in general and, still more 
generally, as a token of their potential independence. 
2. Gilgit 
Gilgit is a small town located amidst high mountain chains. Being a former 
centre of power in the area, it increasingly had become a target of attack and 
occupation by neighbouring powers since the beginning ofthe 19th century. 
The weakening local dynasty was unable to hold Gilgit and looked for alli-
ance and support in Kashmir. For several decades after the mid-1840s, vari-
ous rulers of Kashmir struggled to establish their control over Gilgit against 
local rivals, especially those from the more westward-situated val!ey of 
Yasin. The population of Gilgit suffered heavily from this power struggle. 
War and slavery depleted its ranks.6 When Kashmir succeeded in tightening 
its grip over Gilgit, the govemment of lndia became interested in the region 
due to its fear of a Russian invasion from Central Asia of the subcontinent, 
and it established its own position in Gilgit in the person of a British politi-
cal agent. Gilgit became the locus of dual control: it housed both the 
Kashmiri administration of the Gilgit wazarat (the Gilgit Province of 
Jammu and Kashmir State, which included Gilgit itself, Astor, and Bunji) 
and the British administration of the Gilgit Agency, i.e., the states and gov-
emorships of Hunza, Nager, Punial, lshkoman, Yasin, Kuh Ghizer, and the 
sub-agency of Chilas. Gilgit gained new importance as an administrative 
centre, and its population started to grow again. The dual control, which led 
to many complications and conflicts about authority between the British and 
Kashmir, was abolished in 1935 when the govemment of lndia leased that 
part of the Gilgit wazarat which is located on the westem banks of the Indus 
River from the Kashmir State. The town of Gilgit and its subdistrict came to 
be included in the Gilgit Agency. This state of affairs ended much earlier 
than originally planned. When India and Pakistan gained independence in 
August 1947, the British had to leave Gilgit, too. Two weeks before inde-
pendence, the administration of the whole Gilgit Agency was transferred to 
the maharaja of Kashmir. In the following months, the maharaja, a Hindu 
"' For the effects of. slavery on the population in Gilgit in the last c.entury, cf. 
Müller-Stellrecht 1981. 
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himself but the ruler over a majority of Muslims, hesitated as to whether he 
should join India or Pakistan. When he finally, on October 27th, decided for 
India, Gilgit took the opposite turn and revolted against Kashmiri rule. 
3. A Sketch ofEvents in 1947 
The accounts of that revolt, which include testimonies of many of its pro-
tagonists themselves (mainly military officers), are both numerous and 
bewildering in their number of contradictior.s. A major force behind the 
composition of quite a number of these stories seems to be competition for 
personal honour because many writers/actors strive to enhance their own 
position and contribution to the revolt. Mainly, three groups of actors can be 
identified in the first stage of the freedom struggle: first, a group of officers 
of the Muslim companies of the Kashmiri State troops stationed at Bunji, 
some thirty kilometres southeast of Gilgit on the other side of the Indus 
River; second, the Gilgit Scouts, the local paramilitary force already 
recruited by the British; and third, individuals of the civil population in 
Gilgit. The role of another figure is highly disputed: the involvement of 
Major Brown, a British officer who served the maharaja as the commandant 
of the Gilgit Scouts. Later, when the revolt had turned into a war against 
Indian troops, other military bodies joined the scene, such as the Frontier 
Constabulary and the Chitral Body Guards. 
Before I discuss the present-day reinterpretations of this jang äzädi, I will 
present a rough sketch of its more-or-less undisputed events and examine 
some of the contradictions of its witnesses and protagonists. 
Soon after the Kashmiri Governor Ghansar Singh assumed charge in Gil-
git, on July 30, 1947, it was feared that the maharaja of Kashmir would 
declare accession to India. The population, insofar as it was aware of the 
political changes in the subcontinent, favoured Pakistan instead. Other than 
some shopkeepers from Punjab and Kashmir, there were no Hindus in Gil-
git. Locally, India was conceived of as a state of Hindus, just as envisaged 
by the Muslim League and the Two-Nations Theory of Muhammad Ali Jin-
nah, and not as a secular state as conceived by Nehru and the Congress 
leaders. 
Shortly before the politicalja/sa at Gilgit in October, the assembly where 
the local rajas and governors had to declare their allegiance and loyalty to 
the new · Kashmiri governor, five military officers revealed their political 
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sentiments to each other and decided on a revolt in the case of the maha-
raja's accession to India. These officers were Captain7 Mirza Hassan Khan 
of the Sixth Jammu and Kashmir Infantery at Bunji (and a Gilgiti himself) 
and three Kashmir State officers who had been transferred to the command 
of the Gilgit Scouts, namely Lieutenant Ghulani Hyder, Captain Syed 
Durani, and Captain Mohammad Khan Jabral.8 These four officers are 
mostly called the "group of Muslim officers of the State troops" in the 
literature although three of them served in the Gilgit Scouts. The fifth con-
spirator was the local junior-commissioned officer of the Gilgit Scouts, 
Subedar-Major Mohammad Babar Khan, patemal uncle of the mir ("king") 
of Nager. These five officers are sometimes entitled the "inqiläbi kaunsil" 
(revolutionary council) (e.g., Syed Durani 1985: 377). 
When the declaration of the maharaja for India became known in Gilgit at 
the end of October 1947, the Gilgit Scouts started action. The events 
immediately before the revolt are not totally clear. lt seems that Govemor 
Ghansar Singh got wind of the immediate revolt and ordered Colonel Abdul 
Majeed, the commander of the troops at Bunji, to send a company ofHindu 
and Sikh soldiers as support to Gilgit (on October 3 lst). Captain Hassan, 
also at Bunji, again came to know about this order and somehow convinced 
Colonel Abdul Majeed to send him with his Muslim company to Gilgit 
instead. In the late evening ofthe same day, Subedar-Major Babar Khan sur-
rounded the residency of the govemor in Gilgit. By only the next moming, 
the troops had succeeded in capturing the govemor, who had entrenched 
himself in his house. 
During the night, a platoon of the Scouts under the command of Subedar 
Safiullah Beg from Hunza had been sent towards Bunji to stop the Hindu 
troops that were feared to be advancing against Gilgit. But they met with 
Captain Hassan and his company. Both bodies of troops stayed at the place 
to guard the way while Captain Hassan proceeded to Gilgit. In the moming, 
there was a meeting of the revolting officers to plan their further proceed-
ings. During the next few days, a provisional govemment of the "Islamic 
7 Although most of the involved officers were promoted afterwards, 1 am calling 
them by the ranks which they held during the freedom struggle. 1 chose this prac-
tice in order to prevent confusion, even though it will probably cause resentment 
by some of these officers and their offspring. 
8 Captain Jabral was tran.sferred back to Bunji two weeks before the revolt 
(Mohammad Khari 1985). 
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Republic of Gilgit" was fonned. Raja Shah Rais Khan was appointed presi-
dent of the republic, Captain Hassan became military commander, and the 
other officers also got their respective posts. Right at the beginning, the 
provisional govemment declared its intention to join Pakistan, sent this 
same message to Pakistan, and asked for a representative tobe sent. A mili-
tary operation was started in order to get hold ofBunji. lt succeeded quickly 
and nearly without fight because the Hindu and Sikh troops had already 
deserted the garrison in fear ofbeing attacked. 
Only after repeated telegrams to Pakistan did a representative finally 
arrive at Gilgit on November 16th in the person of Mohammad Alam Khan, 
who took over the administration for Pakistan as political agent and thus 
tenninated what can be tenned the first phase of the jang äzädi, when the 
rebels acted completely on their own account. Two weeks later, when the 
revolting forces were already proceeding to liberate Skardu and Baltistan, a 
Pakistani military officer came to Gilgit and assumed charge as comman-
dant both of the Gilgit Scouts and the Muslim companies of the State 
Forces, which were now combined together as "äzäd (freedom)/orces". 
The freedom fighters were very successful in the beginning and were able 
to occupy much territory that is today again under Indian control. However, 
after a change in the Pakistani military command of the äzäd forces, some 
strategic mistakes led to the retreat from many of the positions won, a 
retreat only ending when a ceasefire was declared on January Ist, 1948.9 
4. Accounts of the Involved Military Officers 
So far, this report will not raise much dissent because it has omitted all the 
disputed points, to some of which I will now turn. The critical question is 
this: Who can be given the credit for the revolt? 
The Kashmir State officers tend to push their own contribution to the fore 
and to minimalize the role of the Gilgit Scouts. Ghulam Hyder writes that 
these four officers alone were responsible for the plan and the organization 
of the revolt. He adds that Subedar-Major Babar Khan was the only pro-
Pakistan Gilgit Scout (1985: 347, 355). Babar Khan himself, on the other 
9 This representation of the events is a very abridged summary of all accounts 
about the freedom struggle. For much longer and more det::iiled.versions, cf. Dl!r:i 
1989 and Manzum Ali 1985b. 
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hand, holds that the Scouts became involved at a very early stage and to a 
large extent. He writes that the Scouts prevented the occupation of the bar-
racks at Gilgit by a Hindu company of the State troops on the very date 
Governor Ghansar Singh took charge (1973: 26). This action is contested by 
Captain Mohammad Khan (1985: 382), but it was confirmed to mein Gilgit 
by the forr.aer Scouts Subedar Safiullah Beg and by many other witnesses. 
Ghansar Singh himself attests that Subedar-Major Babar Khan had already 
expressed on August lst, 1947, the desire to serve Pakistan (1983: 26). 
Babar Khan relates that eleven out of fourteen junior-commissioned officers 
of the Gilgit Scouts took an oath on the Quran that they would participate in 
a revolt for Pakistan (1973: 25). At the occasion of the formation of the 
"inqilabz kaunsil", Babar Khan was able to present these oaths in written 
form to the other conspiring officers (Syed Durani 1985: 377). 
Again, it is disputed who gave the order to start the revolt on the evening 
of October 31 st. Captain Hassan takes the credit for himself and writes that 
he ordered Subedar-Major Babar Khan and Lt. Ghulam Hyder by telephone 
to arrest the governor because he felt safe, expecting the arrival of Hindu 
troops on the next day (Mirza Hassan Khan 1984: 8). But Babar Khan 
objects that. he and the other officers of the Gilgit Scouts took the decision 
independently as they also expected Hindu troops to come to Gilgit and 
thought the evening of October 3 lst to be the last chance for the revolt 
(1973: 27). Babar Khan writes nothing about prior contact with Captain 
Hassan. lt seems probable that he was not aware of the coming of Captain 
Hassan and Muslim soldiers instead of Hindus, for he sent a platoon of 
Scouts towards Bunji to stop the advance ofthe Hindus. 
The next c_ontested issue is the arrest of Governor Ghansar Singh. Babar 
Khan says that he arrested the govemor before sunrise on November 1 st 
after a night-long siege of the residency (1973: 24) and does not mention 
Captain Hassan in this connection. But Captain Hassan writes that the gov-
emor surrendered only after he learned that he, Hassan, instead of Hindus 
with Colonel Abdul Majid had arrived at Gilgit (Mirza Hassan Khan 
1984: 9), a version that is largely confirmed by the govemor himself 
(Ghansar Singh 1983: 33) and also by Subedar Shah Sultan of the Gilgit 
Scouts (Manzum Ali 1985b: 553). Captain Hassan takes the opportunity to 
give the Gilgit Scouts a side-swipe in mentioning passingly that they were 
67 
unable to capture the govemor in spite of the efforts of a whole night of war 
(Mirza Hassan Khan 1984: 9). 
But the question is not only whether Captain Hassan, Subedar-Major 
Babar Khan, or any of the other involved officers was the real hero of jang 
äzädi. For the British, it seems, this honour rests with Major Brown. Trench 
describes him as the real figure behind the events who organized the smooth 
course of the revolt and the transfer of powers to Pakistan (1986: 269ff.). 
Obviously, Major Brown himself held this view too. In his own reports, he 
especially accuses the state officers and, above all, Captain Hassan of self-
ishness and of instigating the whole rebellion only for the purpose of secur-
ing profitable positions in the provisional govemment. These reports con-
tradict the versions of the Scouts' and State Forces' officers in nearly every 
detail. 10 He even claims that he gave Babar Khan the order to surround the 
governor's house and tosend a platoon towards Bunji. 11 But the conspiring 
officers draw a different picture and hold that Brown and his subordinate, 
Captain Mathieson, tried to prevent the revolt and changed sides only after-
wards in order to save their own lives and positions (Mohammad Khan 
1985: 381).12 Syed Durani, who was transferred from Gilgit to the north-
emmost post of Qalamdarchi in upper Hunza a few days before the begin-
ning of the revolt, suspects that Major Brown came to lmow of the impend-
10 Tue two reports of Major Brown are preserved in the India Office Library & 
Records, London. Tue first is called "Precis on the recent events in the Gilgit 
Agency" and deals with the period from August lst to November 16th, 1947; the 
second report, under the title "Precis of the events in Gilgit since the arrival of 
Sardar Mohd Alam, Political Agent", describes the further course of events until 
Brown left Gilgit on January 14th, 1948. Both in: IOR L/P&S/13/1860. These 
reports seem tobe the only source for Trench (1986) for describing the revolt in 
Gilgit. 
11 Major Brown: "Precis on the recent events in the Gilgit Agency": 4. 
12 Major Brown himself confirms this view. He writes: "To oppose the wishes of 
this party [the conspirators] would have been suicidal. Major Brown therefore 
accepted the situation and helped to maintain law and order and advised all con-
cerned to avoid any resort to violence" (ibid.: 6). Lt. Ghulam Hyder (1985) 
admits that he first made the mistake of trusting Brown but that the later events 
proved him wrong. Among the Gilgit Scouts' officers, there is still some dissent 
about the role of Major Brown: in contrast to the sources cited here, two Scouts' 
officers from Yasin affirm his positive role in the revolution. I owe this infonna-
tion to Johannes Löhr. 
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ing plan and intended to weaken tbe position of the conspirators by the 
transfer (1985: 379). 
The attitude of Major Brown especially towards Captain Hassan seems to 
amount to personal enmity. Among otber things, be cbarges bim of baving 
planned severe atrocities against non-Muslims in Gilgit and Bunji 13 and also 
of cowardice because, as be reports, Hassan was not prepared to lead a force 
for tbe liberation of Skardu. 14 Several times, Brown accuses Captain Hassan 
and the other officers of not really working towards accession to Pakistan 
but towards independence in order to secure power for tbemselves. 15 
Major Brown reports many details that are not to be found in tbe other 
texts, but he withholds a piece of information that is presented by nearly all 
otber witnesses: bis own arrest by Subedar-Major Babar Khan on the even-
ing of October 31 st (Babar Khan 1973: 28) and again by Captain Hassan on 
tbe next moming (Gbulam Hyder 1985: 343). From the texts at band, it is 
impossible to judge wbether tbe cbarges of Major Brown against Captain 
Hassan and others are correct or not, but it seems quite probable tbat bis 
attitude towards Captain Hassan was moulded by Hassan's several attacks 
against Brown's position, including tbe arrest. 16 
13 Major Brown: "Precis ofthe events in Gilgit since the arrival .„": 4. 
14 lbid.: 6. 
15 E.g.: "Major Brown and Captain Mathieson soon realized that an underground 
movement was at work „. lt seemed that certain local people under the guise of 
pro-Pakistan activities, were aspiring to political power „." ("Precis of recent 
events in the Gilgit Agency": 1); and: "The scheme of the underground move-
ment was that the Muslim elements of the 6th Kashmir lnfantry in Bunji, the 
Gilgit Scouts and the people of Gilgit sub-division should declare a Jehad in 
favour of Pakistan and having murdered all non-Muslims up to the Burzil-Pass 
should set up an independant [sie] State comprising the former Gilgit Agency and 
Astor, with all political power in their own hands „." (ibid.: 6). 
16 Captain Hassan released Brown only after the intercession of Lt. Ghulam Hyder. 
He wanted to exclude Brown totally from the provisional govemment, but again, 
Ghulam Hyder had him appointed as adviser to the cabinet (Ghulam Hyder 
1985: 352). Also, after the arrival of the Pakistani political agent, Hassan 
demanded the dismissal ofBrown as commimdant ofthe Gilgit Scouts, but Sardar 
Mohmad Alam did not agree with this dcmand ("Precis of the events in Gilgit 
since the arrival „.„': 2). 
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5. The Role of Civilians 
All the witnesses of jang äzädi referred to thus far were in one way or 
another members ofthe military. They are unanimous in declaring that there 
was no real role of civilians and the general public in the preparation and 
implementation of the revolt. Captain Hassan, for example, writes that the 
organization of the revolt was purely military; no civilian played a part. He 
adds that there were no influential civilian leaders in Gilgit who could be 
trusted politically (Mirza Hassan Khan 1984: 8). But this image is strongly 
contested by civilians themselves. They refer to the foundation of a civilian 
secret society that served in preparing the revolt, the tanzim sarfröshän. 11 
This organization was founded by Mohammad Ali Changezi, who, as a 
member ofthe Indian army during World War II, toured northem India and 
became acquainted with the issues of freedom struggle and Muslim separa-
tism.18 Back in Gilgit again, he discussed this matter and tried to promote 
the idea of Pakistan. When massacres between Hindus and Muslims in con-
nection with partition became known, he organized the tanzim sarfröshän 
with the explicit purpose of working for the merger of the Gilgit Agency 
with Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Changezi was a confidant and, also, a foster-
relative of Subedar-Major Babar Khan. 19 The organization seems to have 
aimed mainly at the formation of pro-Pakistan consciousness and attitudes, 
but its members also served as messengers between the different military 
officers involved in the preparation of the revolt. One sarfrösh, Amir Jahan-
dar Shah, had already conveyed a letter about the intended accession to 
Pakistan before the revolt to the Pakistani govemment (Mohammad Ali 
Changezi n.d.). Another one, Ghulam Abbas, carried a request for support to 
the people ofthe Darel Valley, adjacent to Gilgit in the south.20 Later, when 
17 The name translates to "society ofthose who sell their heads", i.e„ who are ready 
to give their lives for the goal of Pakistan. 
18 Mohammad Ali Changezi published an article about the society and its acitivites 
in the journal Sadä-e Baltistan. A copy of it, which is in my possession, is unfor-
tunately not dated. 
19 Babar Khan is the only officer who admits to the existence of the organization, 
but he takes the credit for its formation. He writes that he had asked Mohammad 
Ali Changezi to build the society in order to provide support to the Scouts on the 
occasion ofthe revolt (1973: 25). 
20 This service is attested by certificate~ ir. the possession of Ghulam Abbas, signed 
by Raja Shah Rais Khan and Subedar-Major Babar Khan. 
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the military offensive was started in order to liberate Baltistan, Astor, and 
other regions, many ofthe sarfröSän were recruited to the äzädforces. 
Oral testimonies, especially, leave no doubt about the existence and the 
activities of the tanzim sarfröshän. Still, it is strongly contested. Ghulam 
Hyder writes that he, during the days of jang äzädi, had already feared that 
its history would be turned into a kind of legend that indiscriminately mixes 
fact and fiction. As support for the justification ofhis view, he cites a news-
paper article of Professor A.H. Dani that mentions the tanzim, and he judges 
that this report lacks all and every proof. He had never heard anything about 
this organization during the freedom struggle, and neither Captain Hassan 
nor Subedar-Major Babar Khan had ever told him about it. He concludes as 
follows: "I am asking a simple question: If this organization had existed, 
why did their Jeaders and actors not contact the provisional government?" 
(1985: 353)21 A simple answer to this question might be that they did indeed 
and that Raja Shah Rais Khan, who became president, was himself a mem-
ber of the tanzim (Dani 1989: 342; Shah Rais Khan 1973).22 Shah Rais 
Khan, for his part, ascribes the leadership again to himself and to Subedar-
Major Babar Khan. According to him, Captain Hassan Khan talked much 
about the revolution but was in practice quite inactive in the preparations of 
the revolt (ibid.: 10). 
6. The Established Meaning of Jang Äzädi 
Although the details and personal merits of jang äzädi are highly disputed, 
its general meaning had seemed to be firmly established: the accomplish-
ment of jang äzädi and the purpose of the many sacrifices of the freedom 
fighters during the war was the accession to the Islamic Republic of Pak-
istan. For the "official history", the struggle was fulfilled in that Gilgit and 
Baltistan, the later Northern Areas, became administered by Pakistan. Thus, 
Dani concludes his chapter about the freedom struggle with the following 
words: 
"lt is this spirit of Jehad that inspired the people ofGilgit and Baltistan and 
they enrolled themselves as volunteers to fight along with their men of 
Gilgit Scouts. Finally it is they alone who scored victory against the forces 
21 All quotations from Urdu or German are my own translations. 
22 In his Iater publication, Dani expresses much more caution and.doubt about the 
"taniim sc~.rfröshän" (1989: 342f.), maybe in response to this strict rebuff. 
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of the Maharaja and liberated the entire area, which is today called North-
em Areas of Pakistan. The blood ofthe martyrs who died in the battlefield, 
the material and moral support that the entire people of this Zone gave for 
fight for freedom and their voluntary offer to integrate their land with 
Pakistan, prove the will of the people to cut themselves away from the 
Maharaja and throw away his decision to join with India. Under this cir-
cumstance Northern Areas of Pakistan came into existence to join freely 
out ofhis own accord with Pakistan." 
(Dani 1989: 401)23 
This meaning of jang äzäd'i has also been established ritually in the annual 
commemorations of the freedom struggle, celebrated every year as yöm 
äzädi (freedom day) or jesn äzädi (freedom celebration) on November Ist. 
On this day, a public meeting is convened at Chinar Bagh, the municiple 
park of Gilgit, near the river, where the graves of Captain Hassan and Sube-
dar-Major Babar Khan are situated and where a monument commemorates 
the war and lists the names of all its martyrs. On the occasion, a detachment 
of the present-day successor to the Gilgit Scouts, the Northern Light Infan-
try, participates in a small parade, school boys play sports and perform dra-
mas, and garlands are laid at the monument. Speeches of high functionaries 
of the administration, none of them a local from Gilgit, remember the ideals 
of the struggle and express its consequence: the rule of Pakistan over Gilgit 
and the Northern Areas. For public amusement, a polo tournament that lasts 
for several days starts in the afternoon. 
7. The Formation of a New Local Perspective 
The official meaning of jang äzäd'i has become strongly challenged by the 
local perspective, especially during the last few years. Read, for example, 
the following summary ofthe history ofthe freedom struggle, written by the 
young founder of a local political party, and compare its tone with the pas-
sage ofDani quoted above: 
"When the British left the subcontinent, the maharaja of Kashmir sent his 
governor to establish his absolute control over Gilgit. Then, Gilgit Scouts 
and the public started a war to liberate themselves from the Kashmiri, 
23 I think it is justified to call Professor Dani's work an "official history" because it 
was written at the request of the former P::kfotani Prcsident General Zia Ul Haq 
( cornmunication by Prof. Dani in 1992). 
72 
from the British, and from all foreign powers to become an independent 
country. During this war, sacrifices were made that are unparalleled in 
history „. The population of Gilgit and the Scouts fought, under unknown 
circumstances and without assistance from outside, a jihad against Kash-
mir. Not only Gilgit but also Baltistan, Purig, Dras, Gurez, and the larger 
part of Ladakh were liberated . „ After the struggle for the liberation of 
Gilgit, from November lst to 16th, a free and independent state in the 
shape of the Republic of Gilgit existed on the map of the world. Before 
anything else, this free Gilgit strove to merge with the Islamic state of 
Pakistan, and the provisional government decided for accession. But this 
decision of the provisional government was provisional too, for they 
expected that a government that could decide the fate of the region and 
declare accession would be elected by the people. But from that time until 
today, there has been no lawful organization or elected assembly. Freedom 
and basic Tights have been taken from the people. The region has remained 
without rights, just as it had been before under Dogra-rule. Whoever has 
demanded freedom has become the target of bullets." 
(Nawaz Khan Naji 1988: 19f.) 
The different meaning is evident: the freedom struggle was not accom-
plished by the merger with Pakistan. Here, Pakistan is not at all portrayed as 
the fulfiller of the freedom struggle but as its usurper. This difference is 
explained easily by the political development after the provisional govern-
ment of Gilgit declared its accession to Pakistan. Even today, Pakistan has 
not yet become what was hoped for by the people of Gilgit. lt has not even 
accepted theaccession formally. Pakistan only established its administration 
in Gilgit and Baltistan, which are regarded as "disputed areas" the legal 
status ofwhich can only be resolved together with the final settlement ofthe 
Kashmir conflict. Practically, this means for the Northern Areas that the 
region is not part of the constitutional territory of Pakistan. Its people have 
no right to participate in the formation of the constitutional bodies of Pak-
istan. They can neither vote for the national assembly nor for a provincial 
assembly. They have no right of appeal at the Supreme Court of Pakistan or 
at the High Courts of one of its provinces. 
Tue experience of nearly half a century of Pakistani administration and the 
denial of the rights mentioned have led to a reinterpretation of the history of 
the freedom struggle as it is expressed· in numerous texts written by authors 
from the Northem Areas during the last years. The story of jang äzädi has 
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even become a still-more-central topic of identity for the local people 
because now, it is essentially understood as a story of self-liberation and 
less as a preparatory step for the merger with another state. 
The journal "Bolöristän", which was published in Karachi by students 
from the Northern Areas along with other migrants from there and which 
was the voice of a new political movement that opposes the Pakistani 
administration in its present form, dedicated a whole issue to the commemo-
ration of jang äzädi (no. 2/3, 1992).24 Some of its articles have been pub-
lished before, in Manzum Ali I 985a, but now they have been placed in a 
different context. 
A short introduction to Manzum Ali's article in this issue of "Bolöristän" 
makes the change in interpretation explicit. lt criticizes previous readings of 
jang äzädi as short-sighted in that they treat it as a brief and singular epi-
sode the protagonists of which had only been some Kashmiri officers. By 
contrast, it places the events of 1947 into a long chain of freedom struggle, 
revolt and opposition against foreign intruders, and it demands a revision in 
historiography: 
"Even today, the history of the freedom movement has not been written 
satisfactorily. lt is portrayed in abstract terms as if the endeavour for free-
dom was begun by some deserting officers ofthe State Force as the result 
of partition, as if the population had not played a role in it and as if the 
revolution had been carried out in only a year. But the truth is that the 
freedom movement had already started at the beginning of the 19th cen-
tury. Our chronicle began when on December 13th, 1841, Raja Ahmad 
Shah of Skardu together with the rulers of other states succeeded in revolt 
against Zorawar Singh. After that, the nationalist ruler of Yasin, Suleman 
Shah, fought against the British and the Dogras. And then, Gohar Aman 
established a new power in alliance with other tribal leaders and fought 
against the British „. All of these events prove that, in the population, there 
existed strong disapproval and resistance against the attackers from out-
side, especially against the British and the Dogras, which expressed itself 
from time to time in small revolts. The struggle of 1947 is also a conse-
quence of these historical events. lt is an affliction of our history that it 
24 
After 1993, the publication or°"Bolöristän" was discontinued. 
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was impossible to establisb a regular civil administration. Because of tbis, 
we could not preserve our freedom and gain our fundamental rigbts."25 
(Anonymous 1992a) 
In a similar vein, Manzum Ali complains that thus far, the bistory of tbe 
region bas been written to support the position of the intruders, and be 
demands its rewriting from tbe local perspective (1992: 9). As a practical 
example oftbis revision, be calls Gobar Aman, tbe raja ofYasin wbo else-
wbere is nearly unanimously described as a cruel and merciless, brutal 
ruler,26 tbe only "nationalist" (qömparast) leader of bis time, wbo uncom-
promisingly fougbt against tbe foreign attackers (ibid.). 
The determination of tbe people of the Nortbem Areas to win tbeir free-
dom against all kinds of foreign occupants lies at the beart of tbis reading of 
tbe bistory oftbe freedom struggle (not only of 1947/48). This image is not 
only displayed as an overall interpretation. Manzum Ali tries to prove it by 
bis evaluation of the merits of tbe different agents of tbe struggle. He is at 
pains to bighligbt tbe positive role of locals and the negative performance of 
25 Historically, this passage is not completely correct. There was no revolt against 
Zorawar Singh because this general of the Dogra Raja Gulab Singh (who later 
became maharaja of Kashmir) was already dead at the time of the revolt. 
Zorawar Singh led campaigns to subdue Baltistan, Ladakh and Tibet. In 1841, 
Raja Ahmad Shah of Skardu and other Iocal rajas had to accompany him as hos-
tages on his campaign against Tibet. The Dogra army was defeated on December 
12th, 1841, anci Zorawar Singh was killed in the battle. Only after that did Raja 
Ahmad Shah manage to retum to Baltistan and instigate a revolt against the 
Dogra occupation of the country in 1842. Gulab Singh sent another army to Bal-
tistan and subdued the revolt (Mohammad Yusuf 1987: 58f.; cf. Hashmatullah 
Khan 1991: 358, 361f.). Huttenback dates the defeat of the Dogras by Tibet to 
December lOth, 1841 (1961: 485). Also, Suleman Shah and Gohar Aman had no 
chance to fight against the British because both had died long before the British 
established their authority in the area. 
26 Cf„ for example, this passage by Drew: "He [Gohar Aman] was a most blood-
thirsty man; as much so perhaps, though he had not the same opportunities of 
killing on a !arge scale, as Theodore of Abyssinia. There are many tales told of 
his ferocity and brutality; the Dards [i e„ the people ofwhat is today the Northem 
Areas) generally are rather careless to life, but with his deeds they were dis-
gusted" (1980 [1875): 436f.). The image ofGohar Aman again has tobe supple-
mented by local histories. In his homecountry, Yasin, he was never seen as nega-
tive!y as dsewhere; instead, he was revered as a great historical personality. I 
owe this information to Johannes Löhr. 
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"foreigners" in 1947 and 1948. He stresses that the success ofthe first phase 
of the revolt, until the arrival of the Pakistani political agent, was achieved 
by locals alone without any assistance or guidance from Pakistan 
(1985b: 570). He attributes the later losses of liberated territory solely to the 
mistakes of "outsiders" from Pakistan who had joined the struggle in 1948. 
Thus, he gives the new (Pakistani) command of the äzäd forces the respon-
sibility for the forced retreat during the second phase of jang äzädi 
(ibid.: 608f.). Conceming the role of the Frontier Constabulary, a paramili-
tary force of the North-West Frontier Province that joined the war in 1948, 
he writes: "Only by the cowardice of the Frontier Constabulary Pakistan lost 
the territory around Gurez that the Gilgit Scouts had conquered. Instead of 
fighting at the front, the Frontier Constabulary preferred to go home again" 
(1992: 1 lf.). 
In short, the a1 .hors of the Northem Areas are no longer willing to hand 
over their history to Pakistan; they intend to claim it for themselves. 
Although not always explicit, in this understanding, Pakistan appears to be 
only the last in a long sequence of foreign intruders and conquerors. The 
freedom won in 1947 was lost again afterwards. We have to infer, it seems, 
that the freedom struggle was not accomplished and concluded with the 
ceasefire in 1949 but, rather, that it has to be resumed again. lt is no sur-
prise, then, that the tanzim sarfroshän reappeared again for the first time 
after autumn 1947 as one ofvarious political organizations and parties that 
founded a common platform for the struggle for the political rights of the 
Northem Areas. In an article published in another issue of "Bolöristän", 
Mohammad Ali Changezi displays his view of jang äzädi and the subse-
quent development under the title "Merger with Pakistan or ... ". He con-
cludes with a plea to the people of the Northem Areas: "I appeal to my 
people and to our heroic nation that we break the long fast of silence and 
make it clear again to the honourable govemment of Pakistan that we want 
to gain our freedom and that we know how to defend it" (Mohammad Ali 
Changezi 1993: 23).27 
Nearly every text or speech about the present political situation of the 
Northem Areas alludes in one way or another to the freedom struggle and 
relates it to the present constitutional deprivations. For instance, the intro-
27 The word "nation" in this quotation does not refer to the nation of Pakistan .but to · 
a postulated original nation ofthe Northcm Areas. 
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ductory speech of an All-Parties-Conference of oppositional groups in April 
1993 started with these words: "Since the outward liberation of Gilgit Bal-
tistan, 45 years have passed. But in reality, ... this region is more enslaved 
than before" (Anonymous 1993: 1). 
In some (re-)visions, Pakistan is no longer even represented as a former 
political hope. of Gilgit and Baltistan. A political pamphlet from Gilgit 
reads: "Due to such developments India mobilized its forces on Kashmir 
borders and started bombing Gilgit and Skardu and other towns of Baltistan. 
Due to Jack of air defence system, the local leaders appealed to the federal 
government of Pakistan to intems [sie] of defence equipment as well as 
administrative back up." Here, the decision of the provisional government to 
hand over administration to Pakistan is portrayed as merely a strategical 
step undertaken only out ofnecessity. This version does not even give a hint 
of a movement that endeavoured for the accession to Pakistan because of 
political (and religious) ideals. Naturally, it grossly distorts the historical 
facts, for the Indian Air Force flew air attacks against Gilgit only in the 
summer of 1948, many months after the provisional government had 
decided to transfer administration to a representative from Pakistan, and 
there had already been a substantial movement for the merger with Pakistan 
before that time. But the aim of this revision of history is certainly not his-
torical correctness. lts purpose is to be found in present-day politics. 
This new pe1;spective on the jang iiziidi also broke with the ceremonial 
reaffirmation of its official meaning. The political movement that opposes 
the present f01m of Pakistani administration in the Northem Areas appeals 
to the people to participate no longer in the official commemorations of yöm 
iiziidi. Since 1992, it has organized instead an alternative public assembly 
on November 2nd: Its motto is no longer "freedom day" but "yöm shuhadii", 
day of martyrs, and it cornmernorates as much the freedom struggle of 
194 7 /48 as it does the subsequent political deprivations. 
8. Conclusions 
One reason that this revision ofhistory is occuring only now and not already 
a decade or two ago is, of course, that political frustration is growing by the 
prolongation of its duration. But another reason could be the fact that most 
of the actors and witnesses of jang iizädi are no longer alive. Those who 
propagate the reint~rpretation of its meaning are younger people who lmow 
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about its history only indirectly. Through a growing temporal distance, 
images of the past lose much detail and accuracy. Remembering the past 
becomes less a matter of memory and more a task of reconstruction. This 
reconstruction orients itself to the present and its contexts and experiences. 
The structure of the revision of the meaning of jang äzädi corresponds to 
what Assmann calls the "reconstructivity of cultural memory": 
"No memory is able to preserve a past as such. What remains is only that, 
'which a society in any epoch is able to reconstruct with in its present 
frame of reference' (M. Halbwachs). Cultural memory proceeds recon-
structively, i.e., it always refers its knowledge to an actually present situa-
tion. Although it sticks to unshakeable figures of memory and bodies of 
knowledge, every present puts itself in an appropriating, explaining, pre-
serving, and changing relation to it." 
(Assmann 1988: 13) 
Another aspect of cultural memory is of importance: it is, as Assmann says, 
"identity-concrete" (German: identitätskonkret): "By this, we mean to say 
that a group bases its consciousness of its unity and peculiarity on this 
knowledge [ofthe past] and obtains from this the knowledge ofthe forma-
tive and normative forces for reproducing its identity" (ibid.: 11). This holds 
true not only for cultural identity but also for political identity. The political 
identity of the Northem Areas was essentially related to Pakistan. The very 
raiso:.1 d'etre of the jang äzädi was the wish to become identified with 
Pakistan, to the extent that the rebels wanted their homecountry to become a 
very part of the state of Pakistan. Because this political identity has never 
been achieved, the people of the Northem Areas have begun to look in 
another direction for their own identity. Now, the "same" past is invoked to 
account for an identity that is much more self-centred, one that aims at 
autonomy and delimits or even dissociates the Northem Areas from Pak-
istan. To justify this political turn in the present, the view of the past also 
has to be changed. 
Past and present have one characteristic in common: different and compet-
ing images and understandings are constructed about both (Cohen 
1987: 133). Differing understandings of the present are tumed backwards 
and result in differing representations of the past. Thus it is impossible to 
decide the question, as to whether the jang äzäd~ was accomplished by 
handing over the administration to Pakistan or whether it was betrayed by 
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the same act without deciding whether Pakistan presently runs a kind of 
colonial administration in the Northem Areas or whether it is the trustee in 
the pending Kashmir conflict. There is no absolute or impartial answer to 
these questions. This is not to say that actual answers are fictitious and 
unjustified. Thus, the new local perspective on the jang äzädi is not ficti-
tious but is firmly grounded in the present experience of the people of the 
Northem Areas. They also express this experience by changing their view of 
the past. 
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